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Abstract 
In Tanzania, reforms were mooted in the 1990s to solve two intertwined problems; the financing of investment and 
reducing the fiscal drain on the government to the sector. This study deploys the ARDL Model and paired-sample 
t-statistic tests, with profitability and liquidity data from 1989 to 2020 to examine the impact of the reforms on sectoral 
financial condition in Tanzania. The results suggest that both profitability and liquidity did not significantly improve 
after reforms. Apart from commercialization policy, other variables were not statistically significant with privatization 
and liberalization law exerting a negative pressure on liquidity. The findings, therefore, appear to contradict the 
theoretical view that the reforms improve the financial condition of both the sector and the governments. The outcome 
can be explained by unfinished reforms manifested by continued politicization of the sector hence underpricing and 
underinvestment. To ensure sectoral financial viability and sustainability we recommend that the reform policies such 
as commercialization, corporatization, and independent regulation should be prioritized. These findings will add value 
to policymakers in Tanzania and beyond which are reforming their power sectors by recognizing that efficient pricing 
and investment are key for a viable and sustainable financial condition of the sector.  
Keywords: reforms, liquidity, and profitability   
1. Background 
In Tanzania, electricity was introduced in 1908 by the Germans. In 1922, Great Britain formed the Government 
Electricity Department to manage the public electric facilities left by the Germans. In 1931, these facilities were 
privatized to Tanganyika Electric Supply Company Ltd (TANESCO) and Dar es Salaam and the District Electric 
Supply Company Ltd (DARESCO). To marshal the needed industrialization agenda and accelerate access to electricity, 
in 1964, the two companies were merged. In 1975, the government acquired all shares in the merged company to form a 
state monopoly company, Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd (TANESCO). Thus, the government became the sole 
investor in the sector. This policy was promulgated on the basis that investment in the sector is capital intensive and that 
if left to the private sector would only maximize profits rather than societal welfare.  
Until the early 1980s, the power sector in Tanzania performed well. Later its performance started to deteriorate due to 
underinvestment caused by the government fiscal crisis. The crisis was triggered by the 1970s global economic crisis, 
the Tanzania-Uganda war, the East African Community dissolution, and droughts that led to power supply shortages. It 
was further intensified by the decline in donor's support and shift in lending policies and priorities, the 1986 currency 
devaluation leading to below-cost tariffs, and power supply shortages due to droughts (Ghanadan and Eberhard, 2007). 
By the 1990s, the sector thus became dysfunctional. After a long period of state monopoly, in the 1990s, Tanzania 
began reforms which are anchored on the market-oriented institutional change theories by encouraging privatization and 
competition in the sector. It was hoped that the change in ownership from public to private sector and introduction of 
competition would improve performance due to the quest for profits and survival. 
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Like most countries, Tanzania adopted the standard reform model which entails the introduction of liberalization law, 
independent regulation, independent power producers, unbundling, corporatization, commercialization, energy fund, 
privatization, and competition (see Lee and Usman, 2018; Yang and Urpelainen, 2019). It was theoretically believed 
that reforms would jump-start the performance and maximize societal welfare (Lee and Usman, 2018). In 1992, 
Tanzania thus issued the first national energy policy to liberalize the sector. Except for unbundling, Tanzania has 
attempted to implement almost all elements of the standard reform model (see Appendix 1). These interventions inter 
alia were directed to improve the financial condition of both the sector and government by promoting efficient pricing 
of electric service and attracting private capital.  
Despite the promises, it appears that the sector has continued to exhibit similar characteristics as before reforms. Initial 
studies (Eberhard and Godinho, 2017; Pueyo and Bawakyillenuo, 2017) suggest that the reforms did not improve the 
financial condition as the sector continues to suffer from inefficient pricing leading to a de facto permanent financial 
crisis. This challenge existed before reforms and was among the main reasons of the reforms. Theoretically, the reforms 
were hoped to fix this conundrum of the sector. This paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate on whether the 
reforms improve the financial condition of both the sector by reflecting on Tanzania. It is hypothesized that in Tanzania 
the reforms have not significantly and positively improved the profitability and liquidity of the sector. 
2. Literature Review  
From the theoretical front, Sen, Nepal, and Jamasb (2016) cite that there is no universal theory that governs the reforms 
but much of its underlying logic has the foundation in microeconomic and industrial organization theories. These 
theories such as the laissez-faire theory which its foundation is accredited to Adam Smith (1776) postulates that under 
perfect competition and private ownership the sectoral performance improves and the welfare of society maximized 
whereas monopoly can lead to a deadweight loss. According to theory, the self-interest entrenched in private ownership 
becomes the driving force for an economic agent to operate efficiently while competition serves as a regulator of 
economic activities. In the power sector, Jamasb, Sen, and Nepal (2016) indicate that competition eliminates managerial 
slack, undermines the need for subsidies, and incentivizes management to operate efficiently.  
The 1990s‘ reforms were founded on a belief that a change from state monopoly to a competitive power market would 
foster efficient pricing of electric service thereby improving the financial condition of both the sector and governments. 
The efficient pricing was to stem from subjecting the tariffs determination to market forces or independent regulation 
(Lee and Usman, 2018). For governments the improvement was to come from reduced government subsidies and 
spending to the sector, increased revenues from privatized corporations (taxes and dividends), and proceeds from the 
sale of state-owned enterprises' shares or assets (Besant-Jones, 2006; World Bank, 2016). The sectoral improvement 
was to emanate from depoliticization of tariff setting matters, enhanced operational efficiency and labour productivity, 
improved management style and accountability, use of new technologies, effective organizational structure, and growth 
in IPPs (Eberhard, Rosnes and Shkaran, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. Financial Viability Indicators 
Source: World Bank, 2016 




According to Wooders, Bridle, and Nguyen (2014), a firm is said to be financially viable and sustainable only when can 
sustainably provide adequate power, invests, generate adequate revenues to cover costs, and complies with social and 
environmental norms. Figure 1 illustrates the key elements of a financially viable sector. The financial soundness of the 
power sector determines the scale and speed of investment, electrification rates, service quality, and private sector 
participation. The reforms therefore solve the intertwined problems of financing investment and fiscal drain on 
governments to the sector.  
In countries where at the time of initial reforms prices were below cost, the reforms, helped bring the tariffs to 
cost-reflective levels (Kessides, 2012; Sen et al. 2016). In developing countries depoliticizing tariff matters is however 
limited as subsidizing the service is politically more attractive than raising the tariffs (Rud, 2009). Empirically, so far, 
several studies have been done to investigate the impact of reforms on sectoral financial condition but with varying 
results. In Namibia, Colombia, and 20 developing countries, for instance, Kapika and Eberhard (2010), Pombo and 
Taborda (2006), and Eberhard et al. (2011) respectively, saw that after the reform’s profitability (cost recovery) had 
improved significantly.  
Likewise, using Fixed Effect (FE) Model for data from 114 largest companies in Russia, Abramov, Radygin,  Entov, 
and Chernova (2017) found that change in ownership structure and labour productivity characteristics in the sector had 
improved profitability after the reforms. In Chile and Brazil, Fisher, Gutierrez, and Serra (2004) and Mota (2003) 
respectively uncovered a substantial increase in profitability after privatization. In Norway, Bye and Hope (2005) 
determined that the power market deregulation had increased the return on capital. In contrast, Quiggin (2014) exposes 
that in Australia sectoral profitability and the government's fiscal space did not improve after privatization. Victor (2005) 
thus confesses that privatization does not make the sector profitable but generates early income to cash broke 
governments. On the other hand, Ullah (2015) observed that developing countries that only opted for IPPs without 
divestiture faced difficulties in improving their overall financial condition. Using data from 49 developing countries, the 
World Bank (2016) saw that after the reforms the cost recovery did not improve. Applying the FE Model for data 
(1985-2000) from 51 developing countries, Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatric (2008) found that the reforms did not 
improve profitability as the influence of independent regulation on the cost-of-service remained insignificant.  
According to Besant-Jones (2006), the commercialization of power utilities in developing economies is limited by 
political interference in the sector, lack of autonomous regulatory bodies, large cross-subsidies, customers’ resistance to 
tariff increase due to poor service, financial mismanagement, and inadequate government subsidies. The World Bank 
(2016) reports that underinvestment and underpricing have led power utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa - SSA, to remain 
in a de facto permanent financial crisis with significant reversals in profits. Jamasb, Mota, Newberry, and Pollitt (2005) 
thus confess that the reforms have faced considerable difficulties in most countries as champions underestimated the 
political challenge of moving tariffs to cost-reflective levels. Rud (2009) admits that enhancing cost recovery requires 
integrated approaches that include tariff adjustments, improved revenue collection, reduction in system losses, effective 
expenditures control, and sufficient and predictable transfers from governments. In Tanzania, Pueyo and Bawakyillenuo 
(2017) admit that despite the reforms TANESCO has endured a precarious financial situation leading to chronic 
underinvestment in the sector. Equally, Godinho and Eberhard (2018) indicate that tariffs in Tanzania have remained 
below cost affecting both sectoral technical and financial performance. 
In terms of liquidity, Besant-Jones (2006) suggests that the reforms improve the financial position of both the sector and 
governments. But the outcome from one reforming countries varies. In Latin America, for example, after the reforms, 
the fiscal performance of governments had improved due to increased taxes and dividends and a reduction in 
governments’ subsidies to the sector (World Bank, 2003). In contrast, Byrne, Glover, Lee, Wang, and Yu (2004) 
uncovered that in South Korea, the reforms failed to solve the problem of indebtedness as the reforms were only a 
vehicle for private companies to acquire public assets and retiring the debts through higher tariffs. In Australia and 
developing countries, Quiggin (2014), and Rud (2009) respectively observed no significant improvement in the 
liquidity of both the sectors and governments after the reforms. Likewise, in Indian, Bhattacharyya (2007) found that 
the reforms did not improve the financial position of the sector nor reduce government subsidies. 
Ullah (2015) claims that in most developing countries the reform objectives have not been met due to lack of 
appropriate institutions to support the reforms and political will to the reforms; public anxiety to reforms; political 
interference in management of utilities; weak regulatory framework; lack of separation of policy-making, regulation and 
ownership roles of the state; and wide-spread of subsidies in electricity tariffs. In most developing countries despite the 
reforms, the power sectors are still financially unsound and unprofitable with power utilities in SSA have been long 
technically insolvent, suffering from a structural operating deficit, and continued overreliance on government subsidies 
and loan guarantees to cover operating losses and investment (World Bank, 2016). In contrast, Kapika and Eberhard 
(2010) and Karekezi and Kimani (2002) saw that in Namibia and Uganda respectively the sectoral liquidity had 
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improved after the reforms. In Tanzania, Mwandosya (2013) reveals that before the reforms sectoral regulation was 
inefficient and tariffs were politically determined. 
TANESCO, therefore, failed to recover the operating costs, meet investment needs and financial obligations including 
servicing debts (Poudineh and Peng, 2016; Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). Thus, the sector had to rely on government 
subventions. The creation of EWURA in 2006, among other things, was meant to fix this problem. Both the EWURA 
Act of 2001, the Electricity Act of 2008, and the national energy policy of 2015 require tariffs to be cost-reflective. The 
question however remains, have reforms, the independent regulation specifically improved the financial viability and 
sustainability of Tanzania’s power sector. The World Bank (2013) uncovers that despite the commercial focus of 
TANESCO being improved substantially after the reforms, still falls short of expectations as tariffs have not risen fast 
enough to achieve the operational cost recovery.  
Equally, Godinho and Eberhard (2018) confess that despite various interventions and numerous bailouts, TANESCO 
has remained in a dire financial situation as tariffs in Tanzania have remained at below cost. The World Bank (2018) 
admits that with a quick ratio of 0.12, Tanzania is among the more illiquid sectors in SSA. Victor (2005) reveals that 
where the reforms have not been advanced, the financial solvency of the sector did not improve. Likewise, Sen et al. 
(2016) indicate that where there are weak institutions, regulatory capture would lead to below-cost tariffs thus 
discouraging private investment, lead to poor service quality, and increasing the fiscal burden to governments. The 
World Bank (2016) points out that where the private sector is minimal, tariffs state-controlled and below cost, 
distribution companies sustain severe financial stress thus requiring frequent governments’ bailouts to keep them afloat. 
Besant-Jones (2006) thus confess that in developing economies, the commercialization of electric services is limited by 
political interference and inefficient government subsidies. In the same vein, the World Bank (2017) presents that in 
most developing countries the legal, regulatory, and policy reform in the past 10 years have failed to put the sector on a 
firmer financial footing.  
Despite the vast literature on the reforms, scholars (Govinda, Jamasb, and Nepal, 2015; Yang and Urpelainen, 2019) 
submit that so far there is no conclusive theoretical and empirical consensus about the economic gains of reforms which 
creates a knowledge gap both empirically and theoretically. Theoretically, the recent global experience suggests the 
presence of power supply crises even in highly liberalized markets and limited private sector ownership and 
competition (Jamasb, Sen and Nepal, 2016; Siami-Namini, 2017). In some predominantly public-owned sectors such as 
Norway, China, and Russia however significant improvement have been registered with some companies becoming 
competitive internationally (Chen and Shaofeng, 2005, Poudineh and Peng, 2016; Bye and Hope, 2005). This new 
evidence seems to suggest that the sectoral improvement is not merely a function of the ownership model, but rather 
complex factors including sectoral governance. This revelation, hence, widens the theoretical gap which necessitates 
further research.   
Empirically, an evidence gap exists as the outcome of the reforms are mixed with both success and failure. This is 
partly explained by the differences in country-specific factors; the economic ideology, institutional factors, level of 
economic development, sector endowments, market structure, degree of market opening, and energy mix (Erdogdu, 
2013; Sen et al. 2016). Nepal and Jamasb, (2012), thus suggest that since the reforms in most countries are still a work 
in progress, more studies should be done to unlock appropriate models for specific country. This study reflects on 
Tanzania. Methodologically, the improved financial condition was one of the main goals of the reforms. Regrettably, 
this goal has been under-researched as previous studies which were mostly qualitatively focused on service quality and 
investment as the two, according to Jamasb et al. (2016) were deemed the most important drivers of reforms. Our 
observation is that there is still a considerable uncertainty about the impact of the reforms on the financial condition of 
the sector and the government. Using profitability and liquidity as proxies for measuring the financial condition, this 
study intends to partly fill this methodological gap by applying the most recently developed Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) model to quantify the impact of reforms in Tanzania.  
In Tanzania, it appears that irrespective of reforms, the sector still exhibits similar characteristics as before the reforms. 
However, knowledge gap exists as the subject matter has been understudied. Mwandosya (2013) admits that, despite the 
reforms, the outcome in Tanzania are not well known. Studies on the reforms have been limited and in most cases were 
based on cross-country analysis. Scholars (Besant-Jones, 2006; Lee and Usman, 2018) however suggest that the best 
way to assess the impact is at the country level. This study attempts to bridge this knowledge gap by examining the 
impact of reforms specifically in Tanzania. Overall, this study seeks to answer the question of whether the reforms have 
improved the financial viability and sustainability of the sector in Tanzania and whether the improvements (if any) can 
be directly linked to the reforms. It presents the theoretical and empirical evidence that unravel the existing gap between 
the theory and practice about the reforms.  
The results of this study will thus add value to Tanzania and beyond in several ways. First, policy lessons will aid 
policymakers in reforming countries with new and advanced knowledge about the reforms. Second, it will give scholars 
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and researchers new insights and dynamics of the reforms both empirically and theoretically. Third, it will help the 
general public understand the progress and outcome of the reforms in Tanzania. The remaining sections of this paper 
are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research methodology whilst section 3 discusses the findings of the 
study. Section 4 concludes the study by synthesizing policy recommendations and section 5 is an acknowledgement. 
3. Data and Methodology  
We used data for the period 1989-2020 separated into pre (1989-2005) and post the reforms period 2006-2020). The 
year 2006 was used as the baseline for after reforms as serious reforms in Tanzania only began when Energy and Water 
Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) became operational in 2006. The year 2020 was the last year for which data 
were available at the time of research. To ensure data quality limited data sources with legal custodianship and 
mandates to publish them including TANESCO, Ministry of Energy, EWURA, National Audit Office, and National 
Bureau of Statistics were considered. The paired sample t-test and ARDL model were deployed in the analysis. The 
paired sample t-test was used to measure whether there is a significant difference in mean values as computed by 
STATA 13 between pre and post reforms periods. The ARDL model was applied to determine causality effects and 
cointegration between variables. The model is suitable for small samples, addresses the problems of autocorrelation and 
endogeneity among variables adequately, and is applied when the dependent variables are I(1) and the rest of the 
variables are either I(1) or (0) or both. This model is analogous to those used by Zhang et al. (2008), Polemis (2016) 
and Jamasb et al. (2016). 
We performed the stationarity test and determined the appropriate lags using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit 
Root Tests and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) respectively. The cointegration between variables was analyzed 
using the ARDL Bounds testing approach. The coefficients of variables, serial correlation, the function of form, 
normality and heteroscedasticity, and parameters stability tests were both calculated using MICROFIT Software 5.5; 
one of the most powerful menu-driven time-series econometric packages currently available. It has a range of diagnostic 
and non-nested tests that are not readily available in other packages. Independent variables used conforms to the 
standard reform model. Unbundling was excluded as is yet to be implemented in Tanzania. The IPP was blended into 
privatization as they occurred concurrently hence difficult to separate their effects. The independent variables were 
ranked between 0 and 4 depending on the level of progress from the ideal competitive market in line with the 
recommendations by Erdogdu (2013). The measurement variables were defined as follows: 
Profitability Index (PIt) measures the ability of a firm’s revenues to cover the costs. It is determined as a difference 
between total revenues and total costs, the net profits/losses (Wooders, Bridle and Nguyen, 2014). Simply put profit 
after tax is used as a proxy of profitability and costs recovery measures. For a profitable business operation, the cost 
recovery (Revenue/cost) rate lies between 110% and 115% (Wooders et al. 2014). The increase in profit after tax 
signifies improvement. 
Liquidity Index (LIt) measures the ability of a firm to meet its financial obligations when they fall due for payment 
(Wooders et al. 2014). It is calculated by dividing total current assets by total current liabilities. Any ratio below one 
implies that the firm has difficulties in meeting its financial obligations (ibid). The increase in the current ratio to 1 
signifies improvement.  
The measurement variables were selected for several reasons. First, they were the main drivers of the reforms in most 
countries. Second, previous studies (Zhang et al. 2008; Kapika and Eberhard, 2010; Wooders et al. 2014) used similar 
variables though in a piecemeal fashion. Third, they are consistent with the World Bank's (2009) indicators for 
measuring performance in SSA. The next section presents the empirical findings and discussions of the study.  
4. Results and Discussion  
The discussion is based on the results from the paired sample t-test and ARDL Model. Profitability data contained both 
positive and negative integers, hence model automatically rejected them. Its discussion was thus mainly based on the 
analytical review. 
Table 1 establishes that the variables are integrated of order I(1) and become stationary at their first differences making 
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Table 1. ADF Unit Root Tests Results 
Variable
s 















PI -2.4655 -3.2660 -3.2580 -5.78252 -5.6730 -5.60660 I(1) 
LI -1.24360 -2.60010 -2.64850 -4.68440 -4.59200 -4.60460 I(1) 
LL 0.81650 0.17310 -1.51470 -3.60560 -3.93510 -4.32620 I(1) 
IR 0.93831 -0.47173 -1.87810 -3.60560 -4.29200 -4.19340 I(1) 
COM 1.03240 -0.57934 -3.57830 -3.60560 -4.29200 -4.19340 I(1) 
EF 1.11630 -0.00000  -1.96380 -2.54960 -2.92170 -2.88860 I(1) 
PRIV 0.43004 -1.81300 -1.29750 -3.60560 -3.98860 -4.39630 I(1) 
COMP 0.43916 -1.74190 -1.40240 -3.60560 -3.98860 -4.32100 I(1) 
Critical Values -2.96650 -3.57310  -2.97060 -3.57960  
Source: Author’s computations based on MICROFIT 5.5 
 
Table 2. Bound Tests for Cointegration 
Dependent Variab.   F-Statistic [Prob.] 99%  Conclusion 
         I(0)             
I(1) 
 
DLI 4.82710 [0.074] 3.267 4.54 Cointegration 
Source: Author’s Computations using MICROFIT 5.5 
 
 
Estimated using the F-Statistics , the integration results in Table 2 are fairly higher than the tabulated Critical 
Upper-Bound values of 4.54 at a 99% level of significance. Thus, the null hypothesis of no co-integration among 
variables is rejected.  
 
Table 3. Paired Samples t-test Results 
Variables 












95% CI of the 
Difference    
 
Lower Upper 




-22,200.00 26,616.67 6,654.17 -36,350.15 -7,984.10 -3.33 15.00 0.005 Reject 
PRE_LI - 
POST_LI 
-0.08 0.68 0.19 -0.49 0.34 -0.40 12.00 0.6970 Do not 
reject 
Note: PI= profitability Index, LI= Liquidity Index 
Source: Author’s computations based on STATA 13. 
 
Table 3 indicate that there is a significant difference in mean values between before and after the reforms for 
profitability but not for liquidity as lossess have increased enomously. The null hypothesis that the reforms had no 
significant impact on profitability is thus rejected since p<0.05. In the case of liquidity since p>0.05, we are however 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the reforms have no statistically significant positive impact.  
4.1 Reforms and Profitability   
Contrary to our expectations, we found that instead of improving profitability worsened after the reforms. Our findings 
appear to confirm previous studies (Quiggin, 2014; World Bank, 2016) that the reforms do not necessarily improve 
profitability. They however challenge earlier research (Kapika and Eberhard, 2010; Abramov et al. 2017) that the 
reforms improve profitability. The outcome, therefore, seems to support the laissez-faire theory that efficient pricing is 
plausible only when the sector is subjected to independent regulation and market forces, both of which seem to be 
missing in Tanzania. The outcome can broadly be connected to underinvestment and underpricing in the sector.  
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During droughts, underinvestment and inefficient energy mix have pushed the country into repetitive procurement of 
costly Emergency Power Plants - EPPs. For instance, in 2012, more than 50% of the energy generated was coming from 
hydropower systems. The hydropower systems are normally susceptible to weather variation. Hence, sectoral profits 
were largely affected by the variations in the hydrological conditions. During the droughts in 2012 TANESCO for 
example was compelled to contract costly EPPs to bridge the capacity deficit (see Figure 2). In 2013, while EPPs 
supplied about 11% of the energy generated, their costs accounted for around 43% of generation costs, putting 
TANESCO on the verge of bankruptcy (Eberhard et al. 2018). 
 
Figure 2. Revenue Adequacy Trends 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
 
Godinho and Eberhard (2018) claim that in Tanzania investment is suboptimal because of a lack of coherent and 
up-to-date power sector planning as the planning is characterized by short-term politics, rather than technically sound, 
long-term processes, and lines between planning, policy, and procurement are frequently transgressed.  
Underpricing is manifested by the inability of TANESCO’s revenue to cover the costs. For instance, during the 
droughts in 2012, while average tariffs were US$c16/kWh, the average costs of EPPs were around US$c 40/kWh1. 
Thus, the power crisis progressed into a financial crisis to both the government and TANESCO as tariffs failed to 
sufficiently cover the cost. According, NAO (2017), the loss making position of TANESCO can be linked to the fact 
that it buys electricity from EPP/IPPs at TZS 544.65/kWh and sell for TZS 279.35/kWh. 
                                                        
1The weighted average composed of Symbion-Ubungo 0.19/kWh; Aggreko Ubungo-0.39/kWh; Aggreko Tegeta 
0.40/kWh; Symbion Dodoma 0.78kWh; Symbion Arusha 0.80/kWh. 




Figure 3. Profitability and Cost Recovery Trends 
Source: Author, 2021 based on data from TANESCO 1989-2020 
 
Figure 3 reveals that most of the time cost recoveries have been below 100% suggesting that TANESCO is not breaking 
even in its operation. Eberhard et al. (2011) uncover that the depoliticization of tariff matters improves the financial 
performance of the sector. Thus, underpricing in Tanzania can be connected to government interferences in tariff setting 
matters. For instance, in 2016 the government compelled EWURA to reduce the tariffs by 2% after it has commissioned 
the National Natural Gas Infrastructure through TPDC. Equally, in 2017, the 8.53% tariff rise approved by EWURA 
was turned down by the government for no apparent reason. The result is consistent with former findings (Zhang et al. 
2008) that independent regulators can lead to better financial performance, but in most developing countries, their effect 
on cost-reflective pricing is insignificant. In Tanzania, it appears that the government has failed to grant EWURA 
adequate mandates to adjudicates tariff matters. Our reflection corroborates well with the findings by Pueyo and 
Bawakyillenuo (2017) that to succeed, reforms must be politically desirable and technically feasible. From the results 
we can, therefore, infer that the reforms in Tanzania have not improved the profitability of the sector but rather 
worsened it. The most relevant policy inference from the results is that regardless of the form of ownership, efficient 
pricing of electric service should be prioritized to ensure profitability and overall financial viability and sustainability of 
the sector  
4.2 Reforms and Liquidity  
In our analysis, we have as well determined that sectoral liquidity did not improve after the reforms. 
 
Table 4. ARDL Output for Liquidity Index 
30 Observations used for Estimation from 1989 to 2020 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio  [Prob.] 
LI(-1) 0.563230 0.279950 2.011900  [0.072]* 
LI(-2) -0.568830 0.361220 -1.574700  [0.146] 
LL -0.048172 0.216000 -0.223020  [0.828] 
LL(-1) 0.083635 0.178550 0.468420  [0.650] 
LL(-2) -0.294860 0.175850 -1.676800  [0.125] 
IR 0.606990 0.444630 1.365200  [0.202] 
IR(-1) 0.094795 0.347520 0.272780  [0.791] 
IR(-2) -0.349590 0.229180 -1.525400  [0.158] 
COM 0.625260 0.304440 2.053800  [0.067]* 
COM(-1) 0.328580 0.305520 1.075500  [0.307] 
COM(-2) -0.541520 0.292780 -1.849600  [0.094]* 
EF -0.929940 0.440420 -2.111500  [0.061]* 
PRIV -1.059000 0.650720 -1.627500  [0.135] 
PRIV(-1) -1.415200 0.601920 -2.351100  [0.041]** 
PRIV(-2) -2.152900 0.527450 -4.081800  [0.002]*** 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 8, No. 6; 2021 
55 
 
COMP 0.997740 0.654890 1.523500  [0.159] 
COMP(-1) 2.492800 0.601050 4.147400  [0.002]*** 
COMP(-2) 0.714850 0.321680 2.222300  [0.050]** 
TREND 0.077088 0.032446 2.375900  [0.039]** 
R-Squared 0.88745 R-Bar-Squared 0.68485   
S.E of Regression 0.24826 F-stat. F(18,10)                      4.3803[0.011]   
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.68103 S.D of Dep.Var. 0.44223   
RSS 0.61633 Equat LL 14.6942   
AIC -4.3058 SBC -17.2951   
DW-statistic 1.7376     
F-statistic 95% LB 95% UB 90% LB  90% UB 
4.1480 3.0258 4.5091 2.487  3.7849 
W-statistic 95% LB 95% UB 90% LB  90% UB 
29.0358 21.1804 31.5636 17.4087  26.4944 
Diagnostic Tests     
 Serial Correlation, CHSQ(1)=0.78459[0.376]: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
 Functional Form, CHSQ(1)=1.4535[0.228]: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted 
values 
 Normality, CHSQ(2)=0.23842[0.888]: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
 Heteroscedasticity, CHSQ(1)=0.17716[0.674]: Based on the regression of squared residuals on 
squared fitted values 
Note: ***,  ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
Source: Author’s Computations using MICROFIT 5.5   
 
Table 5 demonstrates that only commercialization policy is statistically significant and influenced the liquidity position 
positively. The coefficients of independent regulation and competition are positive albeit not statistically significant. 
The privatization and liberalization law on the other hand exerted a negative pressure on liquidity though not 
statistically significant. Figure 5 indicates that most of the time the liquidity ratio for the sector has been below 1 
suggesting that TANESCO is financially distressed. The results verify the previous findings (Poudineh and Peng, 2016; 
Rud, 2009; World Bank, 2016) that the reforms do not necessarily improve the sectoral financial liquidity. They 
however dissent from earlier results (Besant-Jones, 2006; Kapika and Eberhard, 2010; Karekezi and Kimani 2002) that 
the reforms improve the liquidity of the sector. The outcome does not support the laissez-faire theory that the 
market-oriented reforms improve the financial condition of both the sector and governments as they contribute towards 
achieving efficient pricing of electric service. Tanzania's experience seems to confirm earlier findings (Ullah, 2015) that 
developing countries that only opted for IPPs without divestiture faced difficulties in improving their overall financial 
condition.  
Cooksey (2017) claims that since 2002 when IPTL came on stream TANESCO has remained in a chronic insolvency 
situation as it has been paying more to IPPs and EPPs than it can charge the customers. As before the reforms, with a 
liquidity ratio of less than one most of the time, it implies that the sector has continued to suffer from a liquidity squeeze 
(Figure 4). The situation is further confirmed by the World Bank (2018) that with a quick ratio of 0.12, Tanzania is 
among the more illiquid sectors in SSA. The politicization of the sector manifested by perpetual government 
interference in pricing and investment decisions is perhaps the main cause for the overall sectoral underperformance. 
Our results are hardly distinct from that of Pueyo and Bawakyillenuo (2017)) that regardless of the reforms, the 
financial situation of the sector in Tanzania has not improved. The World Bank (2018) further shows that despite 
collection efficiency of 92%, system losses of 18%, and cost recovery of 93%, by 2018, TANESCO has failed to 
translate this relatively better operational performance into an improved liquidity position.  




Figure 4. Liquidity Trends 
Source: Author, 2021 based on data from TANESCO 1989-2020 
 
The underpricing and underinvestment, have repeatedly compelled the government to bailout TANESCO’s investment 
and operation costs. According to the World Bank (2018) between 2012 and 2016, the government made transfers to 
TANESCO of about US$249 million as operating subsidies. The World Bank (2016)however links the continued weak 
sectoral liquidity position of TANESCO to insufficient government transfers, too low net revenues, and growing 
indebtedness. Hypothetically, IPPs were meant to reduce the fiscal burden of the government. Cooksey (2017) however 
reveals that IPPs can lead to economic growth and improved livelihoods only when are procured competitively, 
negotiated transparently, and backed up by effective planning and regulatory systems both of which seem to be missing 
in Tanzania. While IPPs were contracted competitively, political interference in the procurement process, lack of proper 
planning, and inefficient regulation rendered scandalous deals (IPTL and Richmond) to be sanctioned. For example, 
while the average tariff was US$c 8.73/kWh the ministry of energy negotiated the PPA with IPTL on behalf of 
TANESCO for US$c21.5/kWh. Tanzania experience stands well with former findings (Pollitt, 1995) that the 
government’s interference in investment decisions increases the costs.  
In Tanzania, the weak financial condition is further demonstrated by the stockpiling of power and fuel suppliers’ arrears 
which have blocked the entire sector from operating efficiently. The supplier arrears have their origin in the 1990s when 
Tanzania began contracting EPPs without raising tariffs to cost of service. NAO (2017) admits that tariffs approved by 
the regulator do not reflect the actual cost of service inhibiting TANESCO’s ability to effectively carry out its mandates 
including paying outstanding debts. The NAO (2020) uncovered that by June 2019, the suppliers’ arrears stood at 
US$414 million (TZS 938.5 billion). The continued TANESCO’s financial distress has thus hampered the overall 
development and sustainability of the sector as the timely recovery of investment is not guaranteed to private investors. 
Tanzania’s experience seems to mirrors Pakistan where Ullah (2015) determined that the power utilities failed to 
recover the full cost of electricity supply from end-use customers leading to a debt surge.  
The worsening of liquidity position can also be related to the deficiency in the subsidy policy. Too low-end users’ 
tariffs imply that TANESCO is subsidizing consumers, which in turn prevents further investment in the sector and 
affects the sustenance of the service provisions. Unlike other infrastructure sectors such as the telecommunication sector, 
where consumers pay for the cost of service regardless of their income status, in the power sector, poor households 
using up to 50kW2 per month are supplied at below-cost tariffs. While the scheme is socially necessary to protect the 
welfare of the poor, TANESCO is however not compensated for the lost revenue which adds to its financial hardship. In 
this study, we observed that after the reforms, the liquidity position of the sector did not improve as predicted. From 
these results we can, therefore, infer that the reforms have not significantly contributed to improving the financial 
position of the power sector in Tanzania.  
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The key policy implications of the findings are twofold; first insufficient capacity due to underinvestment affects the 
financial position of the sector and the progress of the reforms. Second, efficient planning explained by the timely 
investment of the Least Cost Plan based on the diversified energy mix can help improve the financial condition of the 
sector and therefore should be encouraged. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that profitability and liquidity did 
not improve after the reforms largely due to the politicization of the sector leading to underpricing, the unfinished 
reforms as TANESCO continued operating in a de facto state monopoly fashion, and underinvestment which plunged 
the country into persistent power crises and lack of political will to reforms evidenced by the government reluctance to 
implement the reforms’ best practices. The politicization of the sector is however perhaps the main binding constraint 
toward achieving overall sector performance and a threat to the progress and outcomes of the reforms in Tanzania. 
This study has added to the literature on the reforms theoretically, empirically and methodologically. The theoretical 
contribution rests on the fact that improved sector governance is key for improved financial performance rather than a 
change in ownership structure. Methodologically, most of the previous studies in Tanzania were qualitative. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is probably among the first study to try to quantify the impact of reforms on the financial 
condition of the sector in Tanzania. Empirically, the impact of the reforms on performance has been extensively studied 
but different scholars came up with different conclusions. This study, therefore, has added value by unleashing new 
insights about the dynamics of the reforms by showing that limited private sector participation and competition and 
inefficient regulation affect sectoral performance. Practically, it is nearly two decades since Tanzania began the reforms. 
But the outcomes were not very well known. To the best of our knowledge, this is probably among the first to 
holistically quantify the impact of reforms on sectoral financial condition in Tanzania. The next section summarizes the 
main conclusion and policy implications. 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
This study was intended to examine the impact of the reforms on sectoral financial conditions in Tanzania. Our 
empirical findings suggest that after the reforms profitability and liquidity did not improve as predicted. The outcome 
may be associated with sectoral governance challenges manifested by the politicization of the sector, weak institutions 
and incomplete reforms. The results thus point to numerous policy directions. First, to ensure financial viability and 
sustainability of the sector, regardless of the ownership form efficient pricing of electric service should be prioritized.  
Second, underinvestment and ineffective planning affect the sector's financial condition and the progress of the reforms. 
Thus, to ensure long-term secure supply and sustainable sectoral financial health, efficient planning epitomized by 
timely investment of the Least Cost Plan based on diversified energy mix should be encouraged. 
Third, political pressure leading to underpricing and underinvestment seems to have inhibited the sector from attaining a 
viable and sustainable financial path. Thus, depoliticization of the sector by promoting commercialization, 
corporatization, competition, and independent regulation should be highlighted. Lastly, to achieve the first-best 
outcomes, we recommended that policymakers should promote better sector governance and predictable legal and 
regulatory frameworks.  
Like most studies, this study is not without limitations. Some of the limitations are; small dataset due to the short 
history of the reforms and inadequate benchmarking of reform progress against neighbouring countries. As a result, as 
more data becomes available, more research along these spectrums may be conducted in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Reforms Status in Tanzania 
Year Policy Dimension   Key Features Status: Tanzania Remarks  
1992 Independent Power 
producers 
Independent power producers (IPPs) are 
private companies that participate in 
power generation for sale to end-users 
or SOUs. They are introduced as the 
quickest way to increase the installed 
capacity, private investment, and 
competition in the sector and unburden 
governments from funding the new 
power plants 
 In 1992 the national energy policy 
passed lifting TANESCO’s 
monopoly in power generation and 
distribution segments.  
 
 In 1993 bids for IPPs tendered 
leading to the entry of IPTL-103 
MW (2002 online) and Songas -189 
MW (2004).  
Introduced 
1993 Commercialization Commercialization entails observing 
the norms of the private sector of 
operating for profit, maximizing 
efficiency, moving to full-cost recovery, 
introducing cost-cutting measures, 
reducing staff, reducing or removing 
subsidies, and enforcing collections of 
electricity bills. 
 Initiated in 1993 under the World 
Bank VI Project where tariffs were 
modestly increased and prepaid 
meters introduced 
 
 Accelerated during the Net Group 
Solutions, and in 2010-2013 when 
EPPs were procured.  
 
 Officially promoted from 2006 
when EWURA became operational. 
Introduced 
1995 Competitive markets  Competition is an ordering force that 
ensures efficient allocation of 
resources, promotes rivalry between 
suppliers, and eliminates excessive 
profit.  
 
 It involves the provision of electric 
service by two or more rival entities in 
the same service area whereas the 
owners of monopoly infrastructure 
provide equal access to new entrants 
(competitors) on commercial terms 
similar to what would exist in a 
competitive market.  
 In 1995 the single buyer model was 
introduced where TANESCO enters 
PPAs with IPPs. Bilateral 
agreements as well exist where IPPs 
sell directly to the bulk-off taker. 
The commencement of IPTL power 
generation in the 2002 market.  
 
 In 2016, the Regulations promoting 
competition and guaranteeing equal 
access to monopoly infrastructure 
were released.  
 
 The first PPA was entered in 1995. 
IPTL became commercially 
operational in 2002. In 2016 the 
bilateral agreement between Dangote 
Group Industries and Jinan Diesel 
Engine Co. was Ltd was signed. 
Small Power Independent 
Distributors Producers such as 
Mwenga Power Services Limited 
and Andoya Hydro Electric Power 
Company Limited 
Introduced 
1997 Privatization Private investors are allowed to invests 
in the sector previously under state 
monopoly. It includes the transfer of 
public property or business to a private 
entity through outright sale of assets, 
joint venture, or disposal of shares in 
the stock market; outsourcing 
operations to a private firm for a 
specific period (concessions 
agreement); involving the private sector 
in management (management and lease 
contracts); and constructing new 
projects that are either entirely private 
or a public-private partnership; 
deregulation of the sector. 
 1997 TANESCO was specified for 
privatization though the decision 
was reversed in 2005 
 In 2001 the 112 MW power plant 
and Songo-Songo gas facilities were 
privatized to Songas 
 
 In 2003, a concession was awarded 
to Artumas Group to supply power 
to Mtwara and Lindi Regions.  
 
 Between 2002-2005 TANESCO 
was under the private management 
of NetGroup Solutions from South 
Africa. 
Introduced 
2001 Independent Regulation  Independent regulation involves 
separating the regulatory roles from the 
government bodies and granting the 
new organ the right and freedom to 
decide on regulatory matters without 
prior consent from the government.  
 Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority (EWURA) to 
regulate electricity, waters and 
natural gas, and petroleum 
downstream segment.  
Introduced 
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2002 Corporatization  Corporatization is transforming a 
utility company into an independent 
legal entity governed by the principles 
of corporate law such as greater 
operational autonomy, clear 
commercial objectives and 
performance targets, effective 
monitoring systems; and a high degree 
of financial independence and 
transparency.  
 
 Separate utility from ministry, create 
a clear accounting framework and 
provide greater operational autonomy.  
 In 1931 the Electricity Ordinance 
established two quasi-private 
companies: DARESCO and 
TANESCO which were merged in 
1964.  
 In 1975 the government acquired 
EPLC’s shares in TANESCO. 
 In 2002 the incumbent TANESCO 
was officially corporatized under the 
Companies Act of 2002 clarifying its 
mandates against the parent 
ministry.  
Introduced 
2005 Rural Energy Fund and 
Agency 
 Commercial and Non-commercial 
electrification expansion are separated 
from the commercial left under the 
utility mandates. 
 
 The fund helps to speed up access to 
modern energy in rural areas where the 
private sector is unable or unwilling to 
invest due to economic and technical 
constraints.  
 In 2005 the legislation to form the 
Rural Energy Agency and Rural 
Energy Fund was passed to facilitate 
the electrification of the 
non-commercial segment passed. 
   2007 REA became operational 
Introduced 
2008 Liberalization  Law  Involves legal mandate restructuring 
and permitting the private sector 
participation/ownership/imports in the 
sector. 
 
 A good law normally commercializes 
the electrical service by encouraging 
cost-reflective tariffs, criminalizes 
power theft, and insulates the sector 
from political interventions. 
 In 2008 Electricity Act was enacted 
liberalizing the entire power supply 
chain including reform intentions but 
with some prohibitive clauses. 
 
 Presently, there as private investors 
in the form IPPs, Small Power 
Producers (SPPs), Independent 
Power Distributors (IPD), and 
Self-generators (own use).  
 
 In 2015 section 41(6) of the 
Electricity Act that prevented IPPs 
from selling electricity to end-users 
lifted. 
Introduced 
 Unbundling Unbundling entails breaking up a 
vertically integrated state monopoly 
company into multiple power 
generation and distribution companies 
that trade each other competitively, 
raise capital from the capital markets 
and pay dividends and taxes to 
governments.  
 
Vertical and/or horizontal unbundling, 
create independent transmission 
company, separate profitable parts for 
sale to private investors. 
 Plans for unbundling TANESCO 
remains a goal since the 1990s  
Not 
introduced 
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